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Section 1. Introduction 
 
The importance of university research for industrial innovation is widely accepted, so much so 
that any changes in the research environment tend to spark controversy. The recent increase in university 
licensing is no exception. The 84 universities responding to the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM) Survey in 1991 and 2000 reported that invention disclosures increased 84 percent, 
new patent applications increased 238 percent, licenses executed increased 161 percent, and royalties in-
creased 520 percent over the period. While technology managers and university administrators cite such 
figures as evidence of the increasing contribution of universities to the economy, skeptics question the 
impact of licensing on the conduct of university research.  
Central to the debate is faculty behavior. Proponents of licensing argue that without the incentives 
it provides, neither faculty nor companies would undertake the development needed for many results of 
federally funded research to be transferred to industry. This, of course, is the key premise underlying the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which since 1980 has allowed universities to own and license results of federally funded 
research. Critics of the Act claim that academic publication would be sufficient for industry to pick up 
university inventions, and more importantly, they express concerns that potential financial returns from 
licensing have diverted faculty from more basic to applied research.  
Three major issues related to faculty behavior are important for understanding the implications of 
licensing for the science and technology enterprise:   
i. Does this observed increase in university licensing reflect a shift away from fundamental re-
search or simply an increased willingness of faculty to have their work licensed as well as published (or 
both)? It is the former that has been discussed as an “unintended” effect of the Bayh-Dole Act in recent 
Congressional hearings as well as the National Academies Committee on Science, Engineering, and Pub-
lic Policy (COSEPUP). The Act was intended, not to redirect faculty research, but rather to facilitate in-
dustrial application of university research.   
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ii. How is the propensity of faculty to disclose inventions related to individual characteristics 
(e.g., publication record, research sponsorship), and other characteristics (e.g., academic discipline, uni-
versity and/or department effects)?   
iii. What is the life-cycle behavior of faculty with respect to research, publication, and license-
related activity? Evidence on life-cycle productivity will contribute to a better understanding of the sci-
ence and technology enterprise, in general, as the age distribution of scientists and engineers changes (Na-
tional Science Board 2000). 
We know remarkably little about these issues, in large part because the literature on university li-
censing has focused on disclosures, patents, and licenses aggregated by field or university rather than the 
performance of individual inventors. We do not know even the portion of faculty who engage in licens-
ing, much less their personal and research characteristics as compared to faculty who do not engage in 
licensing. In this paper, we attempt to redress this problem by examining the personal and research char-
acteristics of a large sample of science and engineering faculty at six major universities. 
The database we examine has the publication, disclosure,2 and personal profiles of 3,241 faculty 
members at Cornell University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Purdue University, Texas A&M Uni-
versity and University of Wisconsin – Madison over a seventeen-year period. These data allow us to ex-
amine the evolution of faculty research and licensing behavior over time and the extent to which it is re-
lated to individual characteristics such as age or to environmental factors such as academic quality of their 
department. Further, we can address differences in patterns across universities and across disciplines in 
the life and physical sciences, as well as engineering. 
Section 2. What do we know about licensing and faculty behavior? 
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that, for many inventions, technology transfer 
would be difficult at best in the absence of incentives provided by patent licensing. Recent surveys show 
that the overwhelming majority of university inventions are so embryonic that commercial application 
                                                 
2 A disclosure is a formal document that a faculty member files when it is believed that a potentially commercializ-
able invention has been made. 
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requires, not only further development, but also faculty cooperation in that development (Thursby et al. 
(2001), Agrawal and Henderson (2002), Thursby and Thursby (2002)). Jensen and Thursby (2001) show 
that, to the extent that faculty prefer research to development, financial incentives are needed to induce 
them to work with licensees in further development. The emerging picture is that while some inventions, 
particularly those needing little development or faculty involvement (see Colyvas et al. (2002), would be 
transferred in the absence of licensing, the most embryonic might not.3 
We know little, however, about the effect of licensing on faculty research as the literature on in-
dustry-university collaboration and research relates primarily to consulting and sponsored research, and 
the evidence is mixed. While some studies suggest that applied research has increased recently (Cohen 
et.al 1994, Morgan et.al 1997, Rahm 1994) others point to a long history of such research (Mowery et.al 
2001, Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). Cohen et al's (1994) survey of university-industry research centers 
(UIRCs) provides evidence of the countervailing effects of industry collaboration on faculty productivity, 
with so-called commercial outputs of research increasing and publications decreasing (except in biotech-
nology). Given the importance of publications for industrial productivity (Adams 1990), these results are 
cause for concern. By contrast, Mansfield (1995), Zucker et al. (1994, 1998), Stephan et al. (2002), and 
Murray (2002) find a complementary relationship between research productivity and commercial activity. 
Mansfield's (1995) study of 321 academic researchers found that faculty in his sample frequently worked 
on basic problems suggested by their industrial consulting. Similarly, Zucker et al. (1994, 1998) found 
that the most productive scientists in biotechnology tend to capitalize on commercial applications of their 
basic research, starting new biotech enterprises while continuing research in their academic appointments. 
In the case of tissue engineering, Murray (2002) shows that many results are both patented and published.  
Stephan et al. (2002) come the closest to examining our questions of interest. Using individual 
level data from the 1995 Survey of Doctorate Recipients, they examine the relationship of patents and 
publications, as well as life cycle and other individual effects. They find a complementary relationship for 
                                                 
3 With regard to firm incentives to invest, Decheneux et al. (2003) provide evidence based on inventions licensed 
from MIT that the ability to appropriate returns via effective patent protection is an important determinant of 
whether or not firms will commercialize university inventions. 
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patents and publications, with the relationship being strongest for engineers. They also find that non-
tenured faculty are more likely to patent than tenured faculty. For our purposes, the cross sectional nature 
of these data are a drawback. Further, while patents clearly signal faculty willingness to engage in licens-
ing activity, the use of patents excludes information about faculty whose inventions are licensed but not 
patentable. Their approach also excludes observations on faculty who show an interest in licensing by 
disclosing inventions but whose inventions are not deemed commercially viable (and as a result are not 
patented).  
Only a few studies examine invention disclosures and faculty research. Lach and Shankerman 
(2002) find a positive relationship between invention disclosures and the share of license revenue accru-
ing to inventors. While they interpret this as showing the responsiveness of research to financial incen-
tives associated with licensing, we argue that disclosures show the faculty’s willingness to disclose results 
to the technology transfer office and may or may not reflect changes in research agendas. In Thursby and 
Thursby (2002), we examine whether the growth in university licensing is due to productivity of observ-
able inputs or driven by an unobservable change in the propensity of faculty and administrators to engage 
in license-related activity. Our results suggest that changes in the direction of faculty research are rela-
tively less important than other factors, such as a dramatic increase in the propensity of administrators to 
patent and license inventions, as well as increases in business reliance on external R&D. The problem 
with this analysis is that the data are not at the level of the individual scientist, but rather research outputs 
at the university level. 
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies of the relation between licensing activity and re-
search productivity at the level of the individual inventor. However, recent theoretical work has examined 
the faculty member’s choice problem when her income is a function of license revenue as well as her uni-
versity salary. Jensen and Thursby (2003) examine a model in which faculty choose the amount of time to 
spend on basic and applied research given their salary and the share of license income they receive. In 
their model, faculty enjoy both the puzzle-solving aspects of research (see Hagstrom 1965 and Stern 
1999) as well as the prestige associated with successes in their research (see Stephan 1996). The model 
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also allows for research in the so-called "Pasteur's Quadrant," where a researcher's basic research pro-
duces both patentable and scientific knowledge, as well as the type of research characterized by Mansfield 
in which applied research has a positive impact on the researcher's basic research agenda (Mansfield 1995 
and Stokes 1997). They show that increases in the share of license income will lead the faculty to change 
the amount of time they devote to applied and basic research only if the reallocation increases a “compos-
ite” marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic research. This composite rate of substitution incor-
porates not only pure utility effects, but also the extent to which a reallocation of research effort affects 
their productivity in generating reputation and income.  They show that faculty who specialize in basic 
research may well not change from basic to applied research in response to potential license income, par-
ticularly to the extent that their work falls into Pasteur’s Quadrant. Finally, Thursby and Thursby (2001) 
examine a model in which faculty incentives to conduct basic and applied research change over the life 
cycle. In their model basic research is publishable while applied can be licensed. As the faculty approach 
retirement, the incentive for publishable research declines relative to applied since the faculty can collect 
their share of license revenue beyond retirement. 
Section 3. The Data 
We examine the research, demographic and disclosure profile of a group of faculty scientists and 
engineers at six major universities: Cornell University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Purdue Univer-
sity, Texas A&M University and University of Wisconsin - Madison. Note that our choice of universities 
is not random. Given our interest in the effect of licensing on faculty research, it is important to select 
major research universities with substantial licensing activity. As shown in Table 1, all of the universities 
in the sample are among the top 50 universities in terms of total research expenditures, licenses executed, 
and invention disclosures as reported in the 2001 AUTM Survey. All but one of the universities are above 
the average of the top 50. 
The measure we use to reflect faculty interest in licensing is invention disclosures rather than li-
censes executed. While disclosures and licenses are not independent, we believe the former is more repre-
sentative of faculty interest and the latter more representative of commercial quality. That is,  a license 
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disclosure is simply a document that indicates an inventor has a research result that she believes has 
commercial potential. While all universities in the sample require their employees file such disclosures, 
this is hardly enforceable. Faculty may not disclose for a variety of reasons. In some cases they may not 
realize the commercial potential of their ideas, but often faculty do not disclose inventions because they 
are unwilling to risk delaying publication in the patent and license process.4 Faculty who specialize in 
basic research may not disclose because they are unwilling to spend time on the applied research and de-
velopment that is often needed for businesses to be interested in licensing university inventions (see, for 
example, Thursby and Thursby (2002) and Jensen et al. (2003)). Moreover, while a disclosure clearly 
signals a willingness to be involved with licensing, it need not indicate that the research, itself, was moti-
vated by the desire to license. Curiosity driven research can often lead to commercially applicable results 
quite by accident. Indeed, in their interviews of mechanical engineering faculty at MIT, Agrawal and 
Henderson (2002) found that most of them conducted their research with the primary goal of publishing 
results. 
In order to avoid potential sample bias from the choice of faculty to include in our study we use 
the list of science and engineering faculty in Ph.D. granting departments of the six universities given in 
the 1993 NRC survey of Ph.D. granting departments. Our sample excludes any faculty not listed in such 
departments; for example, it excludes medical school faculty unless they also hold appointments in Ph.D. 
granting departments (four of the six universities have medical schools). Departments also are excluded if 
one could not reasonably expect disclosure activity (for example, we exclude astronomy).  
The technology transfer office of each university supplied us with the names of disclosing faculty 
as well as dates of disclosure. Four universities provided disclosure information over the period 1983 to 
1999, and the other two provided information from 1983 to 1996 and from 1987 to 1999.5  Matching 
                                                 
4 One half of the firms in our industry survey noted that they include delay of publication clauses in at least 90% of 
their university contracts. The average delay is nearly 4 months, with some firms requiring as much as a year's de-
lay. 
5 We started with 1983 so as to be well past the date of passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Universities supplied 
us with data as far back as disclosure information could easily be retrieved. The 1997 end was for Purdue Univer-
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these files with the NRC list provides a sample composed of multiple years of research and disclosure (or 
non-disclosure) activity for faculty members on the staff of our universities in 1993. We collected infor-
mation on dates of hire and departure (if applicable) for each of the faculty so that the final sample only 
includes the faculty when they were actually at the respective universities.6 In our sample we have 3,342 
faculty and 45,889 observations where an observation consists of a person/year. The average arrival date 
was 1974, and few departed prior to 1999. 
Thus for each faculty member in our sample, we know whether or not she disclosed (and if so, 
how often) in each year that she was on the faculty of  her respective university during the period made 
available by her TTO.  Of the 45,889 observations, 3,241 ( 7.1%) represent disclosures in a particular year 
by a faculty member. This is our measure of faculty interest in licensing activity. In the remainder of the 
paper, we use the term disclosure to indicate that a faculty member has disclosed at least once in a given 
year. 
Given the publicity expressing concern that academics have become too commercial, the portion 
of faculty expressing interest in licensing is remarkably low. Of the 3,342 faculty, 2,145 (64.2%) never 
disclosed an invention, 495 (14.8%) disclosed in only one year and, and 254 (7.6%) disclosed in only two 
of the years they were included in the sample. Only 67 faculty (2.0%) disclosed in 8 or more of the years 
they were in the sample. Across the six universities, the fraction of faculty who never disclosed ranges 
from 53.9% to 72.2%. This, of course, does not tell us which faculty members disclosed: was it the most 
productive in terms of publication? More to the point, simple counts reveal nothing about changes in the 
nature of the research conducted by the 35.8% who disclosed.  
Section 4. Disclosure Activity and Faculty Characteristics 
In this section we present simple tabulations of disclosures and researcher characteristics. Given 
the number of observations, it is easy to detect any correlation between disclosures and other variables, 
                                                                                                                                                             
sity. Purdue was the basis for our pilot study in this project and that pilot was initiated in 1998, hence we only col-
lected data through 1997. 
6 For many of the faculty we could not find the arrival and departure dates. However, for some of these we were able 
to confirm that they were on the faculty in a given year, even if we do not know arrival or departure dates, so they 
did not have to be dropped from the sample. 
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however small that relationship might be. Thus, it is not surprising that in every case we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the tabulations are random.  
Table 2 gives the distribution of observations and disclosures by university. For purposes of con-
fidentiality we provide only the distribution across universities and do not identify the university (they are 
not listed alphabetically). The second column of the table (“ % of Sample”) gives the percentage of the 
sample (the percentage of the 45,889 observations) from each of the six universities. The third column is 
the percentage of observations from a particular university that are disclosure observations. This is the 
probability (stated in percentages) that an observation from some university is a disclosure observation, 
that is, the probability of disclosure conditional on university or Pr(Disclosure | University). The last col-
umn is the distribution of disclosures across universities. This is the probability (again, stated in percent-
ages) that a discloser is from a particular university, that is, the probability of being from a particular uni-
versity conditional on having disclosed, or Pr(University | Disclosure). For example, in the first row we 
know that 18.8% of the disclosures are from university 1 and that the probability of an observation from 
this university being a disclosure is 4.71%. Further, the probability that a disclosure observation is from 
university 1 is 12.72%. 
Disclosure activity varies substantially across the six universities. Less than 5% of all observa-
tions from universities 1 and 5 are disclosures whereas more than 12% of university 2’s observations are 
disclosures. An interesting question, and one we cannot answer at this point, is how this dispersion relates 
to university policies and culture. 
 As noted above, our sample includes observations over the period 1983 through 1999 and Table 3 
gives the distribution of observations across years. The columns have the same interpretations as those in 
Table 2. The table shows a dramatic increase in disclosure activity from 1983 until the mid 1990s at 
which time activity leveled off with 10%-11% of a year’s observations being disclosures. In 1983, the 
probability that a faculty member disclosed was 0.95% as compared with a probability of over 10% by 
1996. Earlier we noted that only about 20% of the faculty disclose in more than one year. Here we find 
that, in the latter years, about one in ten faculty are disclosing in a given year. Thus, while disclosure ac-
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tivity has increased, it tends to be concentrated in a fairly limited number of faculty. Finally, the last col-
umn in Table 3 gives publications per faculty member for the years reported. Contrary to the notion that 
disclosures may come at the expense of (or show a decline in) publication, publications per faculty in our 
sample more than doubled. Assuming that a publication in 1983 reflects the same research productivity as 
it does in 1999 the increased disclosure activity may in fact reflect increased research activity. Of course, 
as noted earlier publication counts tell us nothing about the nature of research. If, as feared, research has 
become more applied, it may well be the case that applied research, in general, leads to higher numbers of 
publications for the same research effort. 
To examine the nature of research, we map each faculty member’s journal publications into Narin 
et al.’s (1976) classification of the ‘basicness’ of journals. The Narin classification scheme attempts to 
characterize journals by  their influence on other research. While there are a number of definitions of ba-
sic and applied research, this is the only one for which there is an empirical measure. As discussed by 
Narin et.al (1976), basic journals are cited more by applied journals than vice versa, so that journals are 
more basic if they tend to be heavily cited by other journals. For example, if journal A is heavily cited by 
journal B, but journal B does not tend to be cited by journal A, then A is said to be a more basic journal 
than is B. The journals are rated on a 5-point scale. We classify as basic only those publications in the top 
category for basic; this rank encompasses about 62% of all ranked journals publications. Unfortunately, 
Narin’s rating was completed in 1976 (we are not aware of a more recent rating scheme), so that new 
journals are not rated, and it is possible that some journals have changed their focus. While only about a 
third of the publications could be rated, we found no systematic change over time in the number of publi-
cations in our sample that could be rated. In a regression of the fraction of rated publications (where we 
drop observations with no publications, rated or otherwise) on a set of indicator variables for the year of 
the observation, we found an R2 of only .0016 and very few significance differences in the coefficients of 
early versus later years.  
We combine our information on annual faculty activity with information on age, year of PhD, 
academic field, and quality of the faculty members department. In many cases, birth dates are unavailable, 
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in such cases we assume birth dates are 21 years prior to year of undergraduate degree, or, if date of un-
dergraduate degree is not available we assume birth year was 29 years prior to date of Ph.D. The relation 
between tenure and licensing activity is an important issue, but actual data on tenure is difficult to obtain. 
We examine two measures. The first assumes that faculty members are tenured if they have been at their 
university for at least seven year. This,  of course, counts as untenured many who arrive with tenure. Our 
second measure assumes tenure when the faculty member is nine years past the granting of the Ph.D.7 
This, of course, assumes tenure for those who fail to receive tenure at some other university, and who 
then “start over” at their current university. The first measure is not significantly related to disclosure ac-
tivity while the second is related to disclosures. Our prior is that disclosure and tenure are related, thus we 
take the second measure as our preferred measure and use it in the remainder of the paper. The depart-
ment quality measure is taken from the National Research Council (1995). The scholarly quality index is 
based on a survey; departments are rated on a 5-point scale from 0 to 5 where 5 is distinguished. Table 4 
gives summary statistics for the data. The last row gives the percentage of the sample that are tenure year 
observations.  
 Tables 5 and 6 provide information on publications and the portion that are basic in relation to 
disclosures. Not surprisingly, those who publish more are more likely to disclose. What is somewhat sur-
prising is that more than 34% of all disclosures were made by faculty who had no publications in the year 
of disclosure. Note, however, we are considering only contemporaneous publications. Nonetheless, some 
faculty members disclose at some point, but have zero publications for all the years they are in the sam-
ple. Those who disclose at least once in our sample account for 42.9% of all publications.  
In Table 6, we dropped all faculty who did not have any publications in journals rated by Narin 
(1976); this leaves a sample of 12,531 observations. We then tabulated the fraction of basic publications 
with disclosure activity. The probability of disclosure tends to initially increase with the fraction of basic 
publications and then decrease. Those whose research is in the midrange (33% to 67%) have the highest 
probability of disclosure (14%). In the introduction we noted an interest in the behavior of basic research 
                                                 
7 We use nine years to account for post doctoral activities. 
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not only with respect to disclosure activity, but also with respect to time. To examine this question we 
continue with the reduced sample of 12,531. For this group of observations we assume that the fraction of 
total publications that are basic is the same as the fraction of rated publications that are basic. The number 
of basic publications per faculty member by year is then computed and presented in the second column of 
Table 7. In the third column, we present the number of total publications per faculty member by year. 
While these averages have varied over the 17 years, the two columns are very closely related except, pos-
sibly, for the first and last years. The simple correlation between these two columns is 0.96. The implica-
tion is that of no or little change in the relation between total publications and the percent that are basic 
publications. 
 Above we noted that we infer whether a faculty member has tenure in some year based on the 
length of time since the awarding of the Ph.D. In Table 8 we present the tabulation of tenure status and 
disclosure activity. There is a small, yet significant, relationship between tenure and disclosure activity. 
Faculty with tenure are more likely to disclose.  
 Tabulations of age and disclosure activity are in Table 9.  Disclosure activity tends to rise until 
the middle age of 40-50 after which it declines. This pattern, of course, may reflect the fact that publica-
tions (and hence research) tend to follow that same pattern. In the last column of Table 9, we present the 
percentages of those in the different age categories who have at least one publication in a given year. Note 
that, indeed, publications first rise and then fall (after ages 40-50). There is one final point about age and 
our sample. Since our sample includes all faculty members in certain departments in 1993, the average 
age of faculty in the sample is rising. In 1983 the average faculty in our sample was 43.4 years, while in 
1999 it was 55.2 years. 
 For each faculty member, we have information not only on age, but also on year they received 
their Ph.D. It is possible that there are Ph.D. “cohort” effects not captured by age. That is, while age and 
year of Ph.D. are highly correlated in this sample (the simple correlation is –0.87), there is likely to be 
independent information regarding year of Ph.D. that is not captured by age. For example, for a faculty 
member in the sample over the years 1983-99, age varies, but year of Ph.D. does not. If year of Ph.D. re-
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flects to some extent the knowledge base of the researcher, and if the likelihood of disclosure is affected 
by the state of the field at the time of disclosure, then the cohort effect may well affect the likelihood of 
disclosure. This effect will not be captured entirely by age even though age and year of degree are corre-
lated. We break the sample into the three major program areas biological sciences, engineering and physi-
cal sciences. In Table 10 we tabulate disclosure activity with Ph.D. cohorts where we use the decade of 
Ph.D. to classify the cohort. For each of the three major program areas those who completed their degrees 
in the 70’s are most likely to disclose. This effect is strongest for biological sciences. 
 For each faculty member, we have department characteristics from the NRC survey. The charac-
teristics of particular interest here are the major program area of the researcher and the academic quality 
of their department.8  
We used the NRC’s general field classification to determine whether the major program field for 
a faculty member was biological sciences, engineering or physical sciences. It is expected that disclosure 
activity will vary according to the major program field of faculty. This follows both from the nature of 
research (for example, engineering is more applied than physical science) and the market demand for 
technologies (for example, biological science results are more in demand by industry9). Table 11 provides 
a breakdown by these three program areas. We had expected that the most active area to be biological 
sciences. However, as is apparent from Table 11 engineering is substantially more active that biological 
sciences, which is in turn more active than physical sciences. 
Section 5. A Logit Model of Disclosure 
A weakness in what we have done thus far lies in the fact that, with few exceptions, we have 
looked at bivariate relationships between disclosure activity and other variables of interest. We have not 
considered disclosure activity relative to some variable holding constant the values of other variables. 
Here we use a probability model of disclosure wherein the probability of disclosure is modeled as a linear 
function of the above variables. This is purely a descriptive exercise in that we do not have a formal 
                                                 
8 Note, since many faculty are listed in multiple departments, we use the average quality across all departments list-
ing the faculty member. 
9 According to the AUTM survey most licenses executed at universities are in the life sciences. 
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model of disclosure activity, nor do we account for certain potential econometric problems that a formal 
model might suggest needs to be accommodated.10 Future research will consider a formal model of fac-
ulty behavior and what it implies about the proper specification of an econometric model. 
In Table 12 we present the results. Disclosures are coded as ones, and results are presented as 
odds ratios. An odds ratio gives the effect of a unit change in a right hand side variable on the ratio of the 
probability of a disclosure divided by one minus the probability of a disclosure. Hence, an odds ratio of 
less than one implies that the right hand side variable has a negative effect on the probability of disclo-
sure. After dropping observations with missing data, the number of observations is 42,243. The pseudo R2 
is 0.0756 and the chi square statistic for overall fit has a p value of less than 0.0000.  
Age and a more recent year for the Ph.D. have negative effects on disclosure. For example, a 40 
year old who received her degree in 1980 is less likely to disclose than a 40 year old who received his 
degree in 1970. However, over time, any given individual is less likely to disclose. Tenure is positively 
and significantly related to disclosure activity. We remind the reader that our measure of tenure is likely 
to be flawed. Thus, as time passes, a faculty member is less likely to disclose because she is getting older 
and further from the year of Ph.D. Mitigating this effect, to some degree, is the positive, discrete influence 
of tenure. 
As publications increase, the likelihood of disclosure increases. The odds of disclosure rises by 
about 1% for each publication. The fraction of basic research measure used here is a positive value only if 
a publication can be rated and if it is placed in a journal categorized as basic. This measure of basic re-
search is positively related to disclosure activity. Our only departmental effect, other than field, is the 
academic quality of the researchers department. Our data suggest that researchers in higher quality de-
partments are more likely to disclosure. Since we are holding constant the researcher’s publication rate, 
the departmental quality variable either suggests something about the ‘quality’ of the research, or else it 
suggests some positive spillovers from having ‘high quality’ colleagues. 
                                                 
10 For example, it is likely to be the case that publications and disclosure are simultaneously determined. 
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With regard to field of research, those in biological sciences and engineering are equally likely to 
disclose, all else constant, whereas both are more likely to disclose than are faculty in the physical sci-
ences. Across the six universities there are significant differences in the probability of disclosure. In tests 
for the equality of university effects, the coefficients for universities 6 and 4 are not significantly differ-
ent, hence they are equally likely, all else equal, to disclose. In addition, we find that the coefficients for 
universities 3 and 1 are not significantly different. All other comparisons are significantly different from 
zero. We note some rather striking differences in probabilities of disclosure across the six universities. 
Regarding year effects, we find in the bivariate comparison of year and disclosure that only 
0.95% of faculty disclosed in 1983 whereas over 10% disclosed by 1996. Holding constant other effects 
on disclosure activity we find much the same effects. Tests of equality of regression coefficients reveals 
that the coefficients of the 1996 through 1999 indicator variables are not significantly different from one 
another, but the 1997 through 1999 coefficients are significantly different from all other year effects, and 
the 1996 coefficient is significantly different from all prior years with the exception of 1995. Essentially, 
we find results in our logit regression that are similar to the results in Table 3. The probability of disclo-
sure rises from 1983 until around 1996 when the annual disclosure rate tends to levels off.  
Section 6. Concluding Remarks 
A few years ago, a cover story of the Atlantic Monthly titled “The Kept University” questioned 
whether the academic enterprise as we know it has suffered with the increased financial incentives for 
faculty to engage in commercial activities such as licensing (Press and Washburn 2000). Despite the pub-
licity and obvious importance of the underlying issues, we know relatively little about the relationship of 
such activity to faculty research, in large part because the data needed to characterize the relationship are 
at the level of the individual faculty member. Most of what we know comes from data provided by uni-
versity technology transfer offices (either through AUTM or other research from TTO files or surveys). 
With this project, we attempt to reduce the gap in our understanding by building a database that allows us 
to examine, not only the behavior of faculty engaged in licensing, but also to compare these faculty with 
those who have avoided the process. In this paper, we provide a first analysis of these data. 
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Our analysis is preliminary and should be viewed with caution as we have avoided any formal 
economic and econometric modeling. Moreover, the sample represents faculty from six universities. 
These caveats aside, the results provide a striking picture. Note, that while the universities in our sample 
are above the average of the top 50 universities in terms of both research and licensing activity, we find 
that only a small portion of faculty engage in licensing. Indeed, 80% of the faculty in our sample either 
never disclosed or disclosed only once in the seventeen year period. That said, we found a dramatic in-
crease in the portion of faculty who became involved over the period. The percent of faculty disclosing in 
a given year increased from 1 in 100 in 1983 to 1 in 10 by 1996, though it seems to have stabilized at for 
the years 1996-1999.  So the much-publicized increase in licensing activity appears to be concentrated 
among a minority of faculty. Moreover, this increased licensing activity does not appear to signal a 
change in the direction of faculty research for our sample. The portion of publication that is basic by 
Narin’s citation-based index was relatively constant over the period. 
We find significant results regarding age, tenure, and year of PhD. It is not surprising that tenured 
faculty members are more likely to disclose (controlling for age and cohort) than non-tenured. What we 
find a bit surprising is that more recent PhDs are less likely to disclose (controlling for tenure and age). 
Recall, however, that these results are based on a purely descriptive model. Results such as this beg for a 
structural model that would allow us to control for other factors such as funding and university policy pat-
terns.  
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MIT $727,600,000 102 425 
Univ. of Wisc.-Madison $554,361,000 127 277 
Univ. of PA $529,554,951 63 223 
Texas A&M $397,268,000 58 140 
Cornell $396,900,000 63 177 
Purdue $263,440,339 76 118 
    
Average of Top 50 Uni-
versities $325,195,723 51 137 
 
 










1 18.8  4.71 12.72 
2 15.7 12.49 28.16 
3 16.64   6.95 16.61 
4 14.97   6.25 13.42 
5 16.46   4.67 11.03 
6 17.44   7.21 18.05 
 
 












1983 3.98 0.95 0.54 1.62 
1984 4.18 1.33 0.80 1.64 
1985 4.38 1.98 1.24 1.70 
1986 4.58 2.42 1.59 2.49 
1987 5.87 4.62 3.89 2.36 
1988 6.12 5.85 5.13 2.48 
1989 6.42 5.92 5.45 2.33 
1990 6.72 4.99 4.82 2.35 
1991 6.91 7.33 7.27 2.42 
1992 7.06 7.83 7.94 2.57 
1993 7.08 8.53 8.67 2.71 
1994 7.00 8.91 8.96 2.85 
1995 6.74 9.22 8.93 2.92 
1996 6.65 10.31 9.85 3.11 
1997 5.51 11.21 8.86 3.61 
 20
1998 5.43 10.50 8.20 3.84 
1999 5.37 10.17 7.84 3.69 
 
 








AGE 48.35 10.91 
Year of PhD 1970.76 10.46 
Quality 3.91 0.60 
Publications 2.67 8.17 
Tenure (%) 86.3  
 
 










0 48.87 4.87 34.15 
1 - 2 23.85 6.19 21.21 
3 - 4 11.86 9.40 16.01 
5 - 6 5.68 10.98 8.96 
>6 9.73 14.08 19.67 
 
 










No Basic 31.19 9.72 30.67 
<33 2.32 11.00 2.58 
33 - 67 11.75 14.12 16.79 




Table 7. Basic Publications by Year 
Year Basic Pubs/faculty All Pubs/Faculty
Ratio:  
Column3/Column4 
1983 4.96 8.04 0.617 
1984 4.14 7.46 0.555 
1985 4.12 7.24 0.569 
1986 3.75 6.76 0.554 
1987 3.74 6.57 0.569 
1988 3.91 6.56 0.596 
1989 3.61 6.24 0.578 
1990 3.52 6.39 0.551 
1991 3.35 6.11 0.548 
1992 3.91 6.78 0.577 
1993 3.90 6.76 0.577 
1994 4.26 7.20 0.592 
1995 4.32 7.50 0.576 
1996 4.60 7.94 0.580 
1997 5.35 8.97 0.597 
1998 5.74 9.70 0.592 














No 13.7 6.44 12.24 
Yes 86.3 7.13 87.76 
 
 










% With  
Publications 
<30 3.14 5.31 2.39 33.29 
30 – 40 23.99 7.01 24.14 50.09 
40 – 50 31.66 8.09 36.77 54.52 
50 – 60 26.19 6.30 23.69 50.97 
















<1960 16.14 5.23 12.49 
1960 - 1970 25.74 5.81 22.12 
1970 - 1980 36.28 7.90 42.37 
1980 - 1990 20.89 7.21 22.29 
1990 - 1999 0.95 5.23 0.73 
Engineering 
<1960 15.07 6.97 12.45 
1960 - 1970 28.92 7.63 26.15 
1970 - 1980 28.41 9.01 30.32 
1980 - 1990 25.48 9.38 28.30 
1990 - 1999 2.12 11.08 2.78 
Physical Sciences 
<1960 20.28 3.06 15.83 
1960 - 1970 28.90 3.32 24.44 
1970 - 1980 27.89 4.31 30.64 
1980 - 1990 21.76 5.15 28.57 














Bio Sci 37.19 7.30 38.97 
Eng 33.91 8.87 43.18 




Table 12. Logistic Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio t-Stat  
AGE 0.94 -7.89 ** 
TENURED 1.24 3.01 ** 
PUBLICATIONS 1.01 8.15 ** 
FRACTION BASIC RESEARCH 1.43 6.66 ** 
DEPARTMENT QUALITY 1.41 5.96 ** 
YEAR of PHD 0.96 -4.97 ** 
Year Indicators 
  
1984 1.47 1.23  
1985 2.19 2.65 ** 
1986 2.76 3.55 ** 
1987 5.61 6.51 ** 
1988 7.35 7.61 ** 
1989 7.95 7.89 ** 
1990 6.92 7.28 ** 
1991 11.19 9.19 ** 
1992 12.20 9.46 ** 
1993 14.27 9.99 ** 
1994 15.19 10.13 ** 
1995 17.76 10.61 ** 
1996 20.79 11.09 ** 
1997 24.62 11.52 ** 
1998 24.41 11.33 ** 
1999 24.03 11.12 ** 
Field Indicators 
  
ENGINEERING 1.09 1.75  
PHYICAL SCIENCES 0.48 -12.59 ** 
University Indicators 
  
UNIV-2 1.95 6.23 ** 
UNIV-3 1.02 0.24  
UNIV-4 1.38 4.02 ** 
UNIV-5 0.79 -2.46 * 
UNIV-6 1.36 3.62 ** 
 
  ** Significant at 1% level 
  *   Significant at 5% level 
